Other minds embodied

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Standard

Other minds embodied. / Overgaard, Søren.

I: Continental Philosophy Review, Bind 50, Nr. 1, 2017, s. 65-80.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Overgaard, S 2017, 'Other minds embodied', Continental Philosophy Review, bind 50, nr. 1, s. 65-80. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-016-9388-y

APA

Overgaard, S. (2017). Other minds embodied. Continental Philosophy Review, 50(1), 65-80. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-016-9388-y

Vancouver

Overgaard S. Other minds embodied. Continental Philosophy Review. 2017;50(1):65-80. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-016-9388-y

Author

Overgaard, Søren. / Other minds embodied. I: Continental Philosophy Review. 2017 ; Bind 50, Nr. 1. s. 65-80.

Bibtex

@article{2e3a9f8cd2044d4e81d87cc57d9b5c35,
title = "Other minds embodied",
abstract = "I distinguish three kinds of other minds problems—conceptual, epistemological and empirical. I argue that while Merleau-Ponty believes embodiment helps with tackling the conceptual and epistemological problems, he suggests that it is of no clear use in solving (an important variant of) the empirical problem. I sketch some considerations that could lend support to Merleau-Ponty{\textquoteright}s claims about the conceptual and epistemological problems, without claiming that these are conclusive. I then proceed to argue that Merleau-Ponty{\textquoteright}s take on the empirical problem is essentially correct.",
keywords = "Faculty of Humanities, body, embodiment, other minds, Merleau-Ponty",
author = "S{\o}ren Overgaard",
year = "2017",
doi = "10.1007/s11007-016-9388-y",
language = "English",
volume = "50",
pages = "65--80",
journal = "Continental Philosophy Review",
issn = "1387-2842",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Other minds embodied

AU - Overgaard, Søren

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - I distinguish three kinds of other minds problems—conceptual, epistemological and empirical. I argue that while Merleau-Ponty believes embodiment helps with tackling the conceptual and epistemological problems, he suggests that it is of no clear use in solving (an important variant of) the empirical problem. I sketch some considerations that could lend support to Merleau-Ponty’s claims about the conceptual and epistemological problems, without claiming that these are conclusive. I then proceed to argue that Merleau-Ponty’s take on the empirical problem is essentially correct.

AB - I distinguish three kinds of other minds problems—conceptual, epistemological and empirical. I argue that while Merleau-Ponty believes embodiment helps with tackling the conceptual and epistemological problems, he suggests that it is of no clear use in solving (an important variant of) the empirical problem. I sketch some considerations that could lend support to Merleau-Ponty’s claims about the conceptual and epistemological problems, without claiming that these are conclusive. I then proceed to argue that Merleau-Ponty’s take on the empirical problem is essentially correct.

KW - Faculty of Humanities

KW - body

KW - embodiment

KW - other minds

KW - Merleau-Ponty

U2 - 10.1007/s11007-016-9388-y

DO - 10.1007/s11007-016-9388-y

M3 - Journal article

VL - 50

SP - 65

EP - 80

JO - Continental Philosophy Review

JF - Continental Philosophy Review

SN - 1387-2842

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 167805781