Responsibility for Forgetting To Do

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Responsibility for Forgetting To Do. / Grünbaum, Thor.

I: Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy, Bind 89, Nr. 2, 2024, s. 755-776.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Grünbaum, T 2024, 'Responsibility for Forgetting To Do', Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy, bind 89, nr. 2, s. 755-776. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00554-6

APA

Grünbaum, T. (2024). Responsibility for Forgetting To Do. Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy, 89(2), 755-776. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00554-6

Vancouver

Grünbaum T. Responsibility for Forgetting To Do. Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy. 2024;89(2):755-776. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00554-6

Author

Grünbaum, Thor. / Responsibility for Forgetting To Do. I: Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy. 2024 ; Bind 89, Nr. 2. s. 755-776.

Bibtex

@article{24f6ee6339ca41aeacd1f2c8ce8d0edd,
title = "Responsibility for Forgetting To Do",
abstract = "Assuming that an agent can be morally responsible for her forgetting to do something, we can use recent psychological research on prospective memory to assess the psychological assumptions made by normative accounts of the moral responsibility for forgetting. Two accounts of moral responsibility (control accounts and valuative accounts) have been prominent in recent debates about the degree to which agents are blameworthy for their unwitting omissions. This paper highlights the psychological assumptions concerning remembering and forgetting that characterise the accounts. The paper then introduces and reviews recent empirical literature on prospective memory. Finally, it uses the literature to assess the various assumptions. One important implication is that a direct capacitarian control account implies implausible assumptions about the psychological capacity for remembering. A second important implication is that an indirect capacitarian control account and a valuative account highlight different but complementary aspects of remembering and forgetting.",
author = "Thor Gr{\"u}nbaum",
year = "2024",
doi = "10.1007/s10670-022-00554-6",
language = "English",
volume = "89",
pages = "755--776",
journal = "Erkenntnis",
issn = "0165-0106",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Responsibility for Forgetting To Do

AU - Grünbaum, Thor

PY - 2024

Y1 - 2024

N2 - Assuming that an agent can be morally responsible for her forgetting to do something, we can use recent psychological research on prospective memory to assess the psychological assumptions made by normative accounts of the moral responsibility for forgetting. Two accounts of moral responsibility (control accounts and valuative accounts) have been prominent in recent debates about the degree to which agents are blameworthy for their unwitting omissions. This paper highlights the psychological assumptions concerning remembering and forgetting that characterise the accounts. The paper then introduces and reviews recent empirical literature on prospective memory. Finally, it uses the literature to assess the various assumptions. One important implication is that a direct capacitarian control account implies implausible assumptions about the psychological capacity for remembering. A second important implication is that an indirect capacitarian control account and a valuative account highlight different but complementary aspects of remembering and forgetting.

AB - Assuming that an agent can be morally responsible for her forgetting to do something, we can use recent psychological research on prospective memory to assess the psychological assumptions made by normative accounts of the moral responsibility for forgetting. Two accounts of moral responsibility (control accounts and valuative accounts) have been prominent in recent debates about the degree to which agents are blameworthy for their unwitting omissions. This paper highlights the psychological assumptions concerning remembering and forgetting that characterise the accounts. The paper then introduces and reviews recent empirical literature on prospective memory. Finally, it uses the literature to assess the various assumptions. One important implication is that a direct capacitarian control account implies implausible assumptions about the psychological capacity for remembering. A second important implication is that an indirect capacitarian control account and a valuative account highlight different but complementary aspects of remembering and forgetting.

U2 - 10.1007/s10670-022-00554-6

DO - 10.1007/s10670-022-00554-6

M3 - Journal article

VL - 89

SP - 755

EP - 776

JO - Erkenntnis

JF - Erkenntnis

SN - 0165-0106

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 303824858