Trying and the Arguments from Total Failure

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Standard

Trying and the Arguments from Total Failure. / Grünbaum, Thor.

I: Philosophia, Bind 36, Nr. 1, 2008, s. 67-86.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Grünbaum, T 2008, 'Trying and the Arguments from Total Failure', Philosophia, bind 36, nr. 1, s. 67-86. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9096-2

APA

Grünbaum, T. (2008). Trying and the Arguments from Total Failure. Philosophia, 36(1), 67-86. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9096-2

Vancouver

Grünbaum T. Trying and the Arguments from Total Failure. Philosophia. 2008;36(1):67-86. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9096-2

Author

Grünbaum, Thor. / Trying and the Arguments from Total Failure. I: Philosophia. 2008 ; Bind 36, Nr. 1. s. 67-86.

Bibtex

@article{534d70a0dd9211dcbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Trying and the Arguments from Total Failure",
abstract = "New Volitionalism is a name for certain widespread conception of the nature of intentional action. Some of the standard arguments for New Volitionalism, the so-called arguments from total failure, have even acquired the status of basic assumptions for many other kinds of philosophers. It is therefore of singular interest to investigate some of the most important arguments from total failure. This is what I propose to do in this paper. My aim is not be to demonstrate that these arguments are inconsistent or that total failure and naked tryings are metaphysically impossible. Rather, my aim is be to build a case against the possibility of naked, independently existing tryings, by questioning how well we understand the scenarios invoked in their favour. Thus, rather than attempting to present a definitive metaphysical refutation of New Volitionalism, I attempt to diminish or demolish its underlying motivation.",
keywords = "Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy of action, Trying",
author = "Thor Gr{\"u}nbaum",
year = "2008",
doi = "10.1007/s11406-007-9096-2",
language = "English",
volume = "36",
pages = "67--86",
journal = "Philosophia (United States)",
issn = "0048-3893",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Trying and the Arguments from Total Failure

AU - Grünbaum, Thor

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - New Volitionalism is a name for certain widespread conception of the nature of intentional action. Some of the standard arguments for New Volitionalism, the so-called arguments from total failure, have even acquired the status of basic assumptions for many other kinds of philosophers. It is therefore of singular interest to investigate some of the most important arguments from total failure. This is what I propose to do in this paper. My aim is not be to demonstrate that these arguments are inconsistent or that total failure and naked tryings are metaphysically impossible. Rather, my aim is be to build a case against the possibility of naked, independently existing tryings, by questioning how well we understand the scenarios invoked in their favour. Thus, rather than attempting to present a definitive metaphysical refutation of New Volitionalism, I attempt to diminish or demolish its underlying motivation.

AB - New Volitionalism is a name for certain widespread conception of the nature of intentional action. Some of the standard arguments for New Volitionalism, the so-called arguments from total failure, have even acquired the status of basic assumptions for many other kinds of philosophers. It is therefore of singular interest to investigate some of the most important arguments from total failure. This is what I propose to do in this paper. My aim is not be to demonstrate that these arguments are inconsistent or that total failure and naked tryings are metaphysically impossible. Rather, my aim is be to build a case against the possibility of naked, independently existing tryings, by questioning how well we understand the scenarios invoked in their favour. Thus, rather than attempting to present a definitive metaphysical refutation of New Volitionalism, I attempt to diminish or demolish its underlying motivation.

KW - Faculty of Humanities

KW - Philosophy of action

KW - Trying

U2 - 10.1007/s11406-007-9096-2

DO - 10.1007/s11406-007-9096-2

M3 - Journal article

VL - 36

SP - 67

EP - 86

JO - Philosophia (United States)

JF - Philosophia (United States)

SN - 0048-3893

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 2780039