The Body in Action

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Standard

The Body in Action. / Grünbaum, Thor.

I: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Bind 7, Nr. 2, 2008, s. 243-261.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Grünbaum, T 2008, 'The Body in Action', Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, bind 7, nr. 2, s. 243-261. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-007-9072-0

APA

Grünbaum, T. (2008). The Body in Action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 7(2), 243-261. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-007-9072-0

Vancouver

Grünbaum T. The Body in Action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 2008;7(2):243-261. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-007-9072-0

Author

Grünbaum, Thor. / The Body in Action. I: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 2008 ; Bind 7, Nr. 2. s. 243-261.

Bibtex

@article{19a9d2002e3f11ddb7b4000ea68e967b,
title = "The Body in Action",
abstract = "This article is about how to describe an agent's awareness of her bodilymovements when she is aware of executing an action for a reason. Against currentorthodoxy, I want to defend the claim that the agent's experience of moving has anepistemic place in the agent's awareness of her own intentional action. In {"}Theproblem,{"} I describe why this should be thought to be problematic. In {"}Motives fordenying epistemic role,{"} I state some of the main motives for denying that bodilyawareness has any epistemic role to play in the content of the agent's awareness ofher own action. In {"}Kinaesthetic awareness and control,{"} I sketch how I think theexperience of moving and the bodily sense of agency or control are best described.On this background, I move on to present, in {"}Arguments for epistemic role,{"} threearguments in favour of the claim that normally the experience of moving isepistemically important to one's awareness of acting intentionally. In the final{"}Concluding remarks,{"} I round off by raising some of the worries that motivated thedenial of my claim in the first place.",
keywords = "Faculty of Humanities, Bodily awareness, Intentional action, Epistemology of action, Sense of agency and ownership",
author = "Thor Gr{\"u}nbaum",
year = "2008",
doi = "10.1007/s11097-007-9072-0",
language = "English",
volume = "7",
pages = "243--261",
journal = "Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences",
issn = "1568-7759",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Body in Action

AU - Grünbaum, Thor

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - This article is about how to describe an agent's awareness of her bodilymovements when she is aware of executing an action for a reason. Against currentorthodoxy, I want to defend the claim that the agent's experience of moving has anepistemic place in the agent's awareness of her own intentional action. In "Theproblem," I describe why this should be thought to be problematic. In "Motives fordenying epistemic role," I state some of the main motives for denying that bodilyawareness has any epistemic role to play in the content of the agent's awareness ofher own action. In "Kinaesthetic awareness and control," I sketch how I think theexperience of moving and the bodily sense of agency or control are best described.On this background, I move on to present, in "Arguments for epistemic role," threearguments in favour of the claim that normally the experience of moving isepistemically important to one's awareness of acting intentionally. In the final"Concluding remarks," I round off by raising some of the worries that motivated thedenial of my claim in the first place.

AB - This article is about how to describe an agent's awareness of her bodilymovements when she is aware of executing an action for a reason. Against currentorthodoxy, I want to defend the claim that the agent's experience of moving has anepistemic place in the agent's awareness of her own intentional action. In "Theproblem," I describe why this should be thought to be problematic. In "Motives fordenying epistemic role," I state some of the main motives for denying that bodilyawareness has any epistemic role to play in the content of the agent's awareness ofher own action. In "Kinaesthetic awareness and control," I sketch how I think theexperience of moving and the bodily sense of agency or control are best described.On this background, I move on to present, in "Arguments for epistemic role," threearguments in favour of the claim that normally the experience of moving isepistemically important to one's awareness of acting intentionally. In the final"Concluding remarks," I round off by raising some of the worries that motivated thedenial of my claim in the first place.

KW - Faculty of Humanities

KW - Bodily awareness

KW - Intentional action

KW - Epistemology of action

KW - Sense of agency and ownership

U2 - 10.1007/s11097-007-9072-0

DO - 10.1007/s11097-007-9072-0

M3 - Journal article

VL - 7

SP - 243

EP - 261

JO - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

JF - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

SN - 1568-7759

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 4290421