This article is about how to describe an agent's awareness of her bodily
movements when she is aware of executing an action for a reason. Against current
orthodoxy, I want to defend the claim that the agent's experience of moving has an
epistemic place in the agent's awareness of her own intentional action. In "The
problem," I describe why this should be thought to be problematic. In "Motives for
denying epistemic role," I state some of the main motives for denying that bodily
awareness has any epistemic role to play in the content of the agent's awareness of
her own action. In "Kinaesthetic awareness and control," I sketch how I think the
experience of moving and the bodily sense of agency or control are best described.
On this background, I move on to present, in "Arguments for epistemic role," three
arguments in favour of the claim that normally the experience of moving is
epistemically important to one's awareness of acting intentionally. In the final
"Concluding remarks," I round off by raising some of the worries that motivated the
denial of my claim in the first place.