The epistemic significance of political disagreement

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Standard

The epistemic significance of political disagreement. / Hallsson, Bjørn Gunnar.

I: Philosophical Studies, Bind 176, 2019, s. 2187–2202.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Hallsson, BG 2019, 'The epistemic significance of political disagreement', Philosophical Studies, bind 176, s. 2187–2202. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1121-8

APA

Hallsson, B. G. (2019). The epistemic significance of political disagreement. Philosophical Studies, 176, 2187–2202. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1121-8

Vancouver

Hallsson BG. The epistemic significance of political disagreement. Philosophical Studies. 2019;176:2187–2202. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1121-8

Author

Hallsson, Bjørn Gunnar. / The epistemic significance of political disagreement. I: Philosophical Studies. 2019 ; Bind 176. s. 2187–2202.

Bibtex

@article{a875269580df4f70ae26f507f20ed060,
title = "The epistemic significance of political disagreement",
abstract = "The degree of doxastic revision required in response to evidence of disagreement is typically thought to be a function of our beliefs about (1) our interlocutor{\textquoteright}s familiarity with the relevant evidence and arguments, and their intellectual capacities and virtues, relative to our own, or (2) the expected probability of our interlocutor being correct, conditional on our disagreeing. While these two factors are typically used interchangeably, I show that they have an inverse correlation in cases of disagreement about politically divisive propositions. This presents us with a puzzle about the epistemic impact of disagreement in these cases. The most significant disagreements on (1) are the least significant disagreements on (2), and vice versa. I show that assessing the epistemic status of an interlocutor by reference to either (1) or (2) has uncomfortable consequences in these cases. I then argue that this puzzle cannot be escaped by claiming that we usually have dispute-independent reason to reject the significance of politically charged disagreement altogether.",
author = "Hallsson, {Bj{\o}rn Gunnar}",
year = "2019",
doi = "10.1007/s11098-018-1121-8",
language = "English",
volume = "176",
pages = "2187–2202",
journal = "Philosophical Studies",
issn = "0031-8116",
publisher = "Springer",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The epistemic significance of political disagreement

AU - Hallsson, Bjørn Gunnar

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - The degree of doxastic revision required in response to evidence of disagreement is typically thought to be a function of our beliefs about (1) our interlocutor’s familiarity with the relevant evidence and arguments, and their intellectual capacities and virtues, relative to our own, or (2) the expected probability of our interlocutor being correct, conditional on our disagreeing. While these two factors are typically used interchangeably, I show that they have an inverse correlation in cases of disagreement about politically divisive propositions. This presents us with a puzzle about the epistemic impact of disagreement in these cases. The most significant disagreements on (1) are the least significant disagreements on (2), and vice versa. I show that assessing the epistemic status of an interlocutor by reference to either (1) or (2) has uncomfortable consequences in these cases. I then argue that this puzzle cannot be escaped by claiming that we usually have dispute-independent reason to reject the significance of politically charged disagreement altogether.

AB - The degree of doxastic revision required in response to evidence of disagreement is typically thought to be a function of our beliefs about (1) our interlocutor’s familiarity with the relevant evidence and arguments, and their intellectual capacities and virtues, relative to our own, or (2) the expected probability of our interlocutor being correct, conditional on our disagreeing. While these two factors are typically used interchangeably, I show that they have an inverse correlation in cases of disagreement about politically divisive propositions. This presents us with a puzzle about the epistemic impact of disagreement in these cases. The most significant disagreements on (1) are the least significant disagreements on (2), and vice versa. I show that assessing the epistemic status of an interlocutor by reference to either (1) or (2) has uncomfortable consequences in these cases. I then argue that this puzzle cannot be escaped by claiming that we usually have dispute-independent reason to reject the significance of politically charged disagreement altogether.

U2 - 10.1007/s11098-018-1121-8

DO - 10.1007/s11098-018-1121-8

M3 - Journal article

VL - 176

SP - 2187

EP - 2202

JO - Philosophical Studies

JF - Philosophical Studies

SN - 0031-8116

ER -

ID: 195494962